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ABSTRACT

The ultimate

aim of this

transcendental

deduction

matter simply,

it

is successfully

reality

essay is to explicate

of the category

accomplished

condition

of causal relations

empirical. reality

of time.

that the empirical

involves

reality

of the empirical

follows

from the fact

despite

reality

numerical

identity

of time.

First,

it

of the

is argued

('l'h1s .is pr eceded by an a.rg-11fonl

'

of intuition).

This

of time in-

representation

in it.

of time involves

reality

time, and which,

of the

it is argued that

condition

to which different

"First

the

11

identity,

is a

identical

object

It is concluded that

1s a necessary
and further,

of matter

of something permanent.

may be related .

relations

This

.

reality

on the notion of a numerically

of spatial

of numerical

Analogy.

reality.

of

is permanent.

hence,

the empirical.

of the empirical

appearances

condi-

time) which remains numerically

(i.e.,

the empirical

across

This argument centers

possession

the

condition

the manifold of passing moments contained

contention

is a fundamental

the possession

three steps.

that

of a phenomenon which emood1es the property

empirical.

necessary

is a necessary

that the intuitive

It is then argued . that

Secondly,

of experience,

time is a necessary

volves the idea of a unity
identical

This

of something permanent is a necessary

reality

11ent for the claim that

relations.

1f it can be shown, granting _the empirical

of time as a necessary

This demonstration

Kant's

To put the

of causality.

seeks to show that there are causal

empirical. reality

tion

and justify

that

condition

of the

being in space

makes possible

the distinction

representation.

"Refutation

is a necessary

Takir,g matter

to

or,

necessary,

condition

ce that

of the empirical

irreversible

in synthetic

wll1 render

succession,

the notion

of an analysis

but rather,

By simple logical

that

is,

a
of

of the given

stems from the need to

in .experience.

intuition,"

which

The argument

in the "Second Analogy."

deduction,

then,

it is concluded that
is a necessary

reality

of causal relations

empirical.

reality

of time, . Given the fact of experience,

empirical

reality

of time as its necessary ·condition,

necessaril

y. that

there are causal relations,

the

condition

empirical

proven.

of a

the necessity

manner, a scheme, or, · "supporting

is presented

the argument

It is contended

Significantly,

the concept "serviceable"

for causality

involves

rela-

of matter,

sequence of representations,

by the object.

concept of objective

of causal

reality

succession.

succession

does not follow by virtue

notion

reality

which is ca-pable of altera.tion,

of objective

sequence determined

· add,

the empirical

upon the concept of objecti'le

that the . concept

this

of Idealism."

it is argued that

Thirdly,

focuses

is conta i ned, in modified form, 1n

This contention

the second edition

tions

between the (:perma.nent) ob,ject and its

of the

and the

it follows

which is what was to be
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INTRODUCTION
Neither

the proof nor the conclusion

can be understood

other

sections

of the Critique,

1s so thoroughly

section

independently

interwoven that

independently

mm::ea "patchwork"
prospects

~ollows

treatment
to present

1n such a .manner as to preserve

section

any effort

the richness

as does the "Second Analogy."

prov.ide

an excellent

ft,crit..ical

philosophy."

philosophy"

The Critique

is no

On the other hand, the
What

the basic unity of Kantian thought

thought

the

itself,

in

to comprehend an isolated

of the whole is awesome,

so thoroughly

opportunity

contained

The unity of the "critical

of the whole is futile,

of a detailed

No single

of certai.~ conclusions

than the universe

is an attempt

of the "Second Ana.logy..

reflects

of its detail,
the unity

A thorough

of Kant's

study of it will

to grasp the essent-ial

strategy

of

2

I.

TIME

In the "Second Analogy" Kant has some important
about

time.

He observes

It is from this

premise

the "Analogies,"

that

in general,

the experience

of objects

Analogy" must explain
first

section

that

will

time,

by itself,

things

cannot

be perceived.

much of his

argument moves. 1

are offered

as necessary

in time.2

A proper

such statements.

be to present

time upon which the transcendental

treatment

account

deduction

Moreover,

conditions

Consequently,

a unified

to say

of

of the "Second
the goal of this

of those

aspects

of the concept

of

of causality

is founded.
What did Kant have in mind when he employed the term "tirne"?
should be noted
ordinary

talk,

that

this

but also

in technical

well begin by identifying
clear

term is used in diverse

and discarding

the way for comprehension
One often

hears

or on a society's
time passed
speeding

as "seeming"
quickly),

institutions.

trains,

but,

is · concerned

would not merely
I suppose,

is suggested,

say,

hears

usages

so as to

on one's

attitudes,

the expression,

"the

on one of Einstein's

"seem to pass slowly"

to the contrary,

actually

We might

meaning.

of time,"

One often

not only in

discourse.

some of these

If one were a passenger

"time"

it

of Kant's

of "the effects

slowly,"

scientific

manner,

It

(so far

it might pass

would pass more slowly!

In

l1nnnanuel Kant, Critique
of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith translator,
{New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1965), B234, B245. {Hereafter,
all references
to the Critique will be indicated
by "K11 .)

2K, Al77, B219.

respectable
~

philosophical.

the "beginning

and theological.

of time."

is mention

Some have even sought to date the be-

U we are to approach Kant's
~ time.

ewnts.

is,

That

pure

speak of time,

alteration

of time.

on one's

may corrupt,

mental or material

of · whether it

maypass

seriously

is

lacking

objects

itself,

referred

1n time.

to Kant's

more or less

and under what

The motion of the "hands"

in meaning.

or ending,

Though

Hence, the

quickly,

but :this has

may quicken,

time. · Finally ·, it is perfect

speak of time as beginning

for this

nonsense

implies

that

to
time

"comes to be" or "passes

away."

away,• does so 1n time.

Hence, we should be collllllitted to the

absurdity

That which "comes to be" or "passes

that ·time "came to be" or ."passed alra.y" in · time.

~

Manifold

Kant refers
determinate

of Time· !:!! Form

E.! Intuition

to time in the "Transcendental

form in which alone the intuition

possible." 3 Kant is asserting

3!_.BJ7.

to

But to

1s nonsense.

does not pass.

or even of the sun, itself,

clock,

no relevance

from particular

in the sense which Kant ha.s in mind, as causing

in either

conditions,

our idea

Time does not produce effects.

and institutions

may pass in time, time,

question

it 1n abstraction

idea which we seek is repeatedly

intuition

may change,

Attitudes

meaning, we must ":purify"

we must consider

"purified"

This

by Kant as the

•

there

Prophets speak of "the end of time."

ginning.

. things

literature

Aesthetic"
of inner

as "a

states

what he takes to be a synthetic

is

4

a priori

truth,

r,.amely, that

t1ental states,

explicitly

neither

assert

This possibility,
otherwise,

this,

but he seems to be committed to this -position).

then,

1s not denied on grounds of formal logic;
would have to be ta.ken as analytic.

the thought of two mental states,

before the other,

as possible,

is denied is the possibility

subjective

(Kant does not

of 1d1ich 1s before the other.

the denial

Kant regards

it is impossible for one to have two

neither

purely formal,

albeit

of a corresponding

Presumably,

of which is
or •empty."

intuition.

From a

point of view we ~ight -express this impossibility

auch a state

is unimaginable,

of affairs

However, the fact that this

state

even ff

of a:f'fairs

it _is conceivable.

is unimaginable

to a weakness of the 1mag1nat1cm 1n the ordinary

o'f the term,

This inability

to picture

b:lability

one's inability

to picture

thousand apples,
psychology,
latter

in fullness

T'nese latter

The former,

are known a.s the result

a necessary

condition

In Aristotle's
vindicated

as an analytic

given concept of "meaning,"
I believe

4_,
K

Bl52.

with ftfty

The former is known as

of experience,

the law of non-contradiction

condition
truth

of (determinate)

meaning.

which follow.s necessarily

It functions

that Aristotle•

or, say,

axe,

of eXl)erience,

Metaphysics

sense

the concern of empirical
4
is the concern of philosophy,
The

of the possibility

as a necessary

not presented

t1on.

11111tat1ons

alone,

friend,

a. yard filled

must not

from one's

different

the face of a long-forgotten

saying

by

be attributed

is essentially

What

as a principle

s distinction

is
It 1s
from a

of differentia-

between "vindication"

.

5

and •proof"

ot all of Kant's synthetic

validity
Aristotle
instead

is important to bear in •ind when considering

offers

a priori

the objective

assertions.

Note that

no proof of the law .of non-contradiction.

He says

that those who seek proof for what is the ground of all proof

~ow a lack of education.

of a.n analogous justification

I suggest the possibility

cla1.• that time is the fora of intuition

to argue that two states

are di!ferent

of inner states.
(with respect

and not aerely

parts of one complex state,

the particular

relation

argue that

they might

would present

in view of the fact that they lack spatial

qualitatively

identical

to existence)

existences,

one after

I should further

considerable
relations.

the other)

U' I

-.a.intain that,

of vi.ew, it is just this difference
difference.

a.JI

fro:a a.n objective

their

an analysis

of the given f'oraa.l concept of "difference''

corresponding

of "di:tference,"

intuition

objects

are constituted

is,

states

relation

of objects

of temporal relations.

space has pa.rta which, in addition
the te•poral

which

as it does
pos1 tion':' is the

in the case of inner (non-spatial)

(that

states.

to the 11ani-

in space).

Spatial

Any given object

to having spatial

of co-exis-tence.

point

that can be given to the formal

Let us now turn from the iaani!old of inner states
fold of outer states

at

does not stea so much from

troa the bel ie.t that the idea of "di:ff erent te•poral

relation

difficulty

to regard them as

of temporal. position

This clai•

To

If I have two

constitutes

only possible

bear.

t.~oughts it is necessary that they exist

di:C.terent tilaes (i.e.,
different.

I£' one is

they aust be able to identify

which · they, as distinct
co➔ xist

for Kant's

Furthenore,

relations,

in

bear

in an iaportant

6

passage,

Ka.nt asserts

the possibility

that only through the representation

of alteration

(e.g,,

of time is

motion) rendered comprehensible.

"Only 1n time can two contradictorily
opposed objects
meet 1n one and the same object, namely, one after the
other." 5
.
Our conclusion

from the preceding is that the representation
whether inner or outer,

a manifold of intuition,

representation

of the .manifold of time.

fold of time as form of intuition
mani:told of intuition

whether they be relations

form of intuition,
intuition).

ls to consider

or co-existence.

time not merely in its aspect as

but as formal intuition

nte clearest

of temporal relations,

Formal Intuition

nte Unity of~~
Our next task

to the notion that any

constituted

of succession

involves the

Whenwe speak of the mani-

we refer

ls necessarily

(i.e.,

pure object

of

statement Kant .makes of this distincti-0n

occurs near the end of the second edition

of the "Transcendental

Deduction."

"But space and time are represented a priori not merely
as forms of sensible intuition,
but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold (of their own) and therefore are represented with the determination of the unity
of this manifold ••• "
In a footnote

to this

statement,

there is contained what follows,

"Space, represented as object ••• contains more than mere
form of intuition,
it also contains combination of the
man1fold ••• 1n a.n· 1ntuitive representation,
so that the
for11 of intuition
gives only a manifold, the formal
intuition gives unity of representation.
In the Aesthetic

\,

B49

of

7

I have treated
this unity as belo ng in g mer el y to
sensibility,
simply in order to empha size t hat it
precedes any concept,
altho ugh, as a matter of fact,
it presupposes
a synthesis
whic h does not be long to
the senses but through which a ll concepts o f space
and time first
become possible. 11 6
Though the footnote

refer s specifically

may be applied

to time.

representation

of time is

Kant has alre a dy said
the possibility

in one and the same object
something

of a mutual

representation
tion

of time as formal
state

does say that

contradictory

this.

states)

at least

"Different

Now I would like

to the "different

object

as "time".

Hence,

to introduce

6K
_, Bl60.
7_,
K A32.
8K, A32.

At no point
cited

t he

does

above he

a synthe s is of

of a manifold
intuition).

contradictory

a terminology

to both the part

states

(i.e.,
The

is also

as "moments,"

11

7

which does not use

and the whole.

I will

refer

and "one and the same time time,"
of time.

times are not si multaneous

time is constituted

seems that

of one and the same time.

Differe n t moments are part

"Different

states

is the representa-

(ti me, as formal

containing

the

on l y through

of one object

the representation

it

in the Aesthetic.

are part

times"

Tha t is,

of time presupposes

in one object

the same term to refer

It

However, in the passage

implicitly,
times

he re.

compr eh en s ible.

intuition

through

of cont r adictory

states

which involves

of time as single

present,

exists

intuition

the formal

the understanding

idea

relation

obvio usly

t hat only

render .ed comprehensible.

of contradictory

Kant explicitly

t o space,

but successive.

of moments which are successive.

118

8

We have been told
to the manifold

t:bne, as formal

(succession

and the manifold
becomes,

that

of moments).

intuiti

This relation

of moments must be made clear.

in what sense

to the manifold

does the representation

of moments?

on, gi ve s unity

or; what sort

between

Our question,

then,

of time provide
of unity

t ime

unity

does the manifold

of moments possess?
A manifold
representation

of particular
of the concept

would represent
particulars

moments might be unified

in unity

of "moment".

all

possible

The concept

of unity

(let

us call

it a conceptual

This,

all

possible

however,

unity)

the

of "moment"

moments, th a t is,

which might be subsumed under it.

the sort

through

is net

with which we

are concerned.
On the other

as referring

hand,

it

is not correct

to the idea of "the

One might r epresent

in unity

all

totality

rocks.

conceptual

We do not grasp

intuition

by thinking

have identified

of all

the rocks

idea of the set of all
in origin.

to regard

But this

it as the set

what might be called

actual

closely

in the · idea of time as a single

in each successive
distinction
the self.
-ceptions".
that

there

moment.

by way of reference
Recall

Hume's reference

His purpose
was a single

is a real

I think

What

This is more
manifest

illustrate

this

of the unity

as a "bundle

justifications

or spiritual

unity.

identity

to Hume's doctrine

was to refute
substance,

unity.

we can further

to the self

unity,

In each case I

conceptual

in contradistinction

the

of time as formal

moments.

I seek to express
expressed

through

is an artificial

the nature

a merely

of t ime

moments".

in existence

again

of all

the unity

of

of per-

for the assertion
identity,

of which

9

each successive
Hume

perception

was but a modification.

would allow from a philosophical

conceptual

unity expressed

Kant's contention

This essential

·wasthat

point of '\7iew

:ln the notion ot' "bundle."

mere

Now it is

that time is not merely a bundle of moments. To

it is a single

the contrary

The only unity

object manifest

in

eacnsuccessive

idea is expressed . in the opening .statements

moment.

of the First

Analogy.

"All appearances are 1n time, and in it alone, as
substratum (as permanent form of inner intuition),
can either co-existence
of succession be represented.
Thus the time 1n which all change of appearance must
be thought, remains and does not change. 0 9
.
.

Kant suggests

the need to represent

representation

of "a line progressing
a series

fold constitutes

to int'inity,

through the
in which the mani-

of one dimension only1 and we reason from

the properties

of this

one exception,

that while the parts

parts

time analogi~y

line to all

the properties

of time, with this

of the line are simultaneous, the
10
·
·
of time are al'l(ays successive."
Note that the various points

on the line

are not merely different,

but, in addition,

parts

of one

and the same line.

Nowwe have spoken of the "ma.nU'old of tine" and of the "unity
of time."

Time contains

a ma.nU'old of successive

moment is pa.rt of one and the same time.
proposition
representation

moments. Yet each

I think that this latter

is confirmed if it is the case that only through the
of time as a "real unity"

is the representation

of the

10

manif"o1d of time possible,

through a closer

That this

examination of the relation

necessarily

involved

necessarily

involved in the representation
which makes the moents

Jianifold)

they are successive.

That two moments are di:fferent
-condition

for their

diff'erent

ti11es (as two points

existence

of two times

successi've.

momentsare successive,
states

different

A distinction

the

~ be

The

lines).

as a possibility

with respect

illpossibility

given the con-

In the idea of alteration

Kant, himself

i:f' two

but are

say there

there

which are not only successive,
says so much.

is no suggestion

11

On the other

of an underlying

was a succession,

substrate.

but no alteration,

•When we think of cha."lge we think ·that

it implies

the continuance
of something identlcal
1n that which
1s char,.g!ng, and that in consequence it ts necessary

•

and

1s conbut parts
hand,

it

{say, two mental states)

what A. H. Smith has to says

B2JJ.

of

part

may be drawn between the idea of "alteration"

where there

~'

(henc~,

The point . to be made is that

two phenomena are successive

might

time di:tferent

on different

my be that

case we

be

of one and the ·same object.

idea of two states

of one object.

1n

they are not merely di:fferent,

that of "mere succession,"
tained

may be

logic,

will

of the mani:f'old of time

Two moments

is here asserted

of transcendental

of succession

ls a necessary but not a sufficient

. hence I do not den1 its

to formal. logic,

clusions

being

What is

of succession.

in the representation

for the very fact
1s that

the cage can be seen

1s in tact

In such a
Note

11

to perceive something permanent vhen we are
conscious of change.
But even if this were allowed •••
it would still be necessary to recognize · that change
is not the only form of time determination.
There
is also succession.
Now in regard to succession it
is necessary to think of the continuity or permanence
of time itself,
but it is not prima. facie obvious that
it is neces~
to think of anything else ldlich is
.
·
permanent. nl2
Succession may be distinguished

from alteration

the idea of an object which persists

includes

id.ea of something permanent, or at least

is not of course,
ultimately

time itself.

be understood

justified

as requiring

in our contention

time ( time as persisting,
llOaents are

the representation

I submit succession

is true, · then,

numerical identity

of which successive

makes possible

the representation

Reality

precicates

£!

representation,

representathat

is, a

are unified.

Time

the idea of time

we nr~st confront the question

12A. H. Smith, Kantian Studies,
1~7), p. 17.

is

aspect as

numerical identity,

Now that we have gone at some length to describe
as intuitive

id.entity,

the idea of time, as intuitive

1n ldlich contradictory

Ih!_ Empirical

nwnerical

only through

of time in its essential

t1on 1nvol ves the idea of a persigting,

is

we a.re

To put the matter graphically,

In short,

must

of the unity of

that the ~presentation

the accompanying representation

object

that is, the

a permanent, even if this

-of time a.s a persisting,

"fiowing" possible.

the latter

:permanez:it, which

relatively

If this

so many manifestations)

of the manifold of time.

in time,

Nevertheless,

nothing other than time itself.

single

1n that

of what

(Londona Oxford University

Press,

·

-

12

sort

is to

of reality

be attributed

the matter,

we might answer that

cendentally

ideal.

To say that

objectively

13

objectively

validity

with respect

el!"pll:ically

real

to all

.

To ju.mp headfirst
real

. into

but trans-

employs thes:e terms . in the Aesthetic.

time is empirically

is to say that

objects

that

it

is

may be given

through

.

But what does it mean to re£er to a representation
I take it · that

valid?
if it

time is

Kant, himself,

valid

our senses.

to time,

can be ascribed

tion or property

to an object,

of the object.

to time,

here meani."lg that

property

of things

a representation

has objective

that

is,

1f it

Note that Kant ~enies

is a condi-

reality

absolute

is denied that time is a condition

it

from the conditions

apart

as

or
of

of the possibility

sensible intuition.
This constltl.ltes
the transcendental
ideality
of
t1me. 14 But what is implicitly
af:firmed by the · denial is that time is
or property

a condition
according

of things

to Kant, a rep:resentation

and only 1f one of two things
make the object

possible

said to be a priori
A paradoxical

to,

situation

on one hand, as an object

a condition

ception).

But this

l'.3i{, B52.
14
K, B52.
1

-·

5ic Bl25.

ascribed

if'

:may be

is true.

to an object

Either the representation

must

must mke the representation

under the f'ormer condition,

determinant

the other,

Now

or the object

1 5 Time qualifies

possible,

given in sens.ible intuition.

and hence,

·
is

of ·the object.

may be noted here.

(an object

Time has been referred

for pure intuition),

or property of objects

1s · ea.sily enough. explained.

(i.e.,

and on

objects

of per-

.To say that

time is

l'.3

a condition

of the object

position

certain

suggests

is to say the object

1n the temporal

order.

the temporal order itself

is temporal,

or has a

Reference to time as object

within which the object has a

position.
In general,

thought)

it is a rule

that an object

(technically,

or its properties

reality ) only if they are possible

empirical. reality.

this

itself,

(have empirical.
~

perceptions.

Special

Throughout the "Analogies"

problems

is not perceived.

it is repeated

17 What 1s perception?

it will help to review some basic distinctions

his analysis

tion of intuition

states

is in immediate relation
is directed..

ceived., or it may refer

intuition

the term "intuition."

to its
that

To understand

Kant has drawn in

has a systematically

defini-

ambiguous

to the act whereby the representation
to the representation

simply as a particular

mind is the opposition

initial

to an object and to which all thought as a

sense . we may follow Professor
quite

Kant's

it is that through which a mode of knowledge

18 "Intuition"

meaning. It may refer

the latter

of a particular

itself.

Hintikka

· 19

idea,

is apper-

If we keep to
in understanding

What Hintikka

idea and a universal,

has in
that

16!, B27J.
l?!,

.

of experience.

We have, to begin,

means

exist

of empirical.

however, if we apply this rule to time with respect

accrue,

time,

.

a postulate

B219, B225, B226, B2J8.

lf\_, A19
19 Jaakko Hln tikka, "Kant On The Mathematical Method," in Kant
Studies Today, L. W. Beck editor, (La.Salle, lll1nois1 Open Cou.rt,

1969), p. 119.

is,

14

a concept.

But particular

mere sensations.
larity

is

ideas

A necessary

the possession

framework.

and sufficient

of a unique

Mere sensations,

intuitions.

may be opposed,

condition

position

having

in addition,

in

to

of particu-

the spatio-temporal

no such position,

are not

20

Kant maintains
intuition

that

are given

it

through

is

the human condition

sensibility

that

objects

of

alone.

"Objects are given to us by means of sensibility,
and it alone yields us intuitions."21
One mai recall
an object

with

of pure

intuition,

Our apparent

contradiction

multifarious

use of that

term,

one which includes

an object.
however,

puzzlement
hence,

away the problem

that

time,

not given

can be resolved
term "object".
whatsoever

The term has a stricter
meaning

that

which exists

itself,

is said

through

sensibility.

if only we recognize
In the broadest

comes before
sense

to be

sense

the mind,

Kant's
of the

time is

in the above sentence,

in space

and time.

Paton

explains

thusly:

."Though space is here spoken of as an 'object',
strictly
speaking neither
space nor time is an object.
An object must be an appearance of things-in-themselves
and must be given in empirical
intuition.
Space and
time are only conditions
of objects,
but we may call
them objects
by a kind of analogy. 11 22
Now let

us consider

as "the

effect

far

the term "sensation".

of an object

as we are affected

upon the faculty

by it ••• "

Kant identifies

sensation

of representation,

He goes on to say,

"that

so
intuition

2Ciz, B44.
21K
_, Al9.
22H.J. Paton, Kant 1 8 Metaphysic of Experience,
Macmillan Company, 1936), Vol. I, p. 98.

(New York:

The

15

which is in relation
empirical.

112

3

to the object

Empirical

through

intuition,

then,

sensation,

is entitled

is an essential

element

in

given

in

experience.24
Experience
space

and time.

sensation.
(and this
there

presupposes

the representation

To say that

To say,
alone

something

in addition,

indicates

that

actuality

of something

is given
it

is to say there

is given

in space

or empirical

reality)

and time
is

to say

is intuition.
"Perception
exhibits
the reality
of something
and in the absence of perception
no power of
tion can invent and produce that something.
a reality
sensation,
therefore,
that indicates
or in time, according
as it is related
to the
11
25
the other mode of sensible
intuition.

We may understand

perception

with

the form of intuition,

tion.

11

As an example let
a certain

tree.

a certain

manifold

textures,

etc.).

represented
lar

is

part

intuition

us take,

then as the conjunction
as synonornous with

as a possible

In the representation
of sense-data
These things

as occupying
of space.

the empirical

or,

intuition

arises

23K, A20.
2 4K
_, Bll9.

25K
_, A374.

object

of the tree

(i.e.,

certain

(perception)

out of the conjunction

is contained
of colors,

But the tree
moreover

the pure intuition
of that

bit

of space.

of sensation

intui-

of experience,
there

amount of space,

involves

of sensation

"empirical

patches

are sensations.

a certain

This idea

in space;
imaginaIt is
in space
one or to

is also
a particu-

of space

and

The empirical

and intuition.

In

16

addition

to these

factors

involves

judgment.

isolated.

three

But this

factors,

speak of perception

experience

sensation,

us return

:reality

of reintegrating
solving

this

pointing

those

facts

One direction
time is not,

else,

involves

accepting

superfluous),
as constituting

To repeat,

hence,
its

perceived,
The other

that

searches
reality.

for

the

idea

and now have the difficulty

which may- be taken
Yis that

implies

that

reality

•

time,

»re

of time,

other

that

with something

proper one, I think,

be percei."Yed'. ( the

something

in

of pin-

idea th&t the assertion

direction,

time cannot

is some-

to isolate

the empirical

by the

nor a moment ·

if anything,

the difi'icult

which constitute

by itself,

time,

We have struggled

of experience

is supplied

1s perceiv~d.

Neither

There are two directions

difficulty.

_what 1s

problem of explaining

of time.

a moment.

it.

When we speak of

two.

What 1s perceived,

of time from the menagerie

When we

three.

to the original

can be perceived.

which occupies

which

and thought.

intuition,

we have in mind the first

aeant by the empirical

thing

is an element . of recognition,

is not our prese nt concern. . We have

we have in mind all

Now let

in time,

there

"by

itself"

is

than perceivability

The former app;n>ach is taken

by Paton.

"Does Kant mean we can be aware of space . and t.ime
from all objects of experience?
Certainly
we
cannot perceive empty time or empty space1 he insists
on this over and over again in the Analogies in regard
to time •• • To perceive time and space, we must perceive
things in time and space, and we get the ideas of absoor
lute or empty time and space only by ~gating
thinking
away objects
in ~ime and space .,"
apart

26H. J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Exnerfence ,, (In Two Volumes,
New Yorks The Macmillan Company, 1936), Vol. I, p. llJ.
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. Note the manner in which Paton so easily
Does

glides

over the problem,

Kant provide Pat .on with any warrant for speaking like

does speak of "_empty time. "27 But to be true to the text,

this?

Kant

what 1s

on "over and over again" 1s not merely that empty time cannot

insisted

be perceived,

but that

more, with what right

time,

itself,

can Paton suggest that

something in til!le, one perceives
perceives

cannot be perceived.

time.

insofar

Further-

as one perceives

It would seem that

if one

something in t:1me, one :perceives something in time, rather

than time • . Is a linguistic

convention being adopted?

that when I speak of the perception
the perception

Are we to say

of a moment 1n time I simply mean

of something in time?

Does Kant ever speak this

way?

It seems that he does in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science · (agaln the passage concerns space~ but the same point will
apply to time).

"Consequently, the space .in which we are to set up
experience :regarding motions must also be capable of
being sensed, 1, e., must be indicated by what can be
sensed; and this space as the sum total of all objects
of experience and. itself an object of experience is
called empirical sJa,ce, Now, such space, if its motion
is to be capable of being perceived, presupposes again
another enlarged material space in which it is movable,
and this enlarged space presupposes just as well another,
and so on to · infinity.
"28

If we allow ourselves
this
llind),

to speak of the "perception

sense (and even then it 1s merely a ~rt
we would have to understand

of time" 1n

of time which we have in

time, in this context,

as not only

the form but the matter of intuition.
This is probably more in acco:rd
27!£, B237.
28Imma.nuelKant, Meta ysical Foundations of Natural Science,
James Ellington
translator,
New Yorks The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1970), :p. 19.

18

with the ordinary

is fine,

usage of the word.

but I don't

what constitutes

be clearer,

and will

reality

reality

more consistent

into the necessary

conditions

I suggest that

is constituted

by its

foundation

consists

in its

being a condition

an object
that

(It

shares this

And if this

the moment which this

quality

as such.

the existence
be an object

this

object

perceived,

because it

of time
is an

reality

of time
objects. 29

of empirical

1s intuited

with space).

rather

The fact

that

by the fact

It J11Ustbe recognized. as being

occupies bears a relation

reality

recognized

that

of succession

a manifold of successive

of other moments requires

which occupies or fills
obscurely

moments,

them.

that

But
there

I think the reasons for

if one says empty moments cannot

and if other moments exist,

29~, B52.

reality

not only occupies a moment, but 1s in time.

or empirical

are expressed

The empirical

is so, then it must be further

to other moments, since time contains
and since the object

of time.

temporal -position is constituted

it must be represented

in time.

reality

inquiry

object of perception

or property

sort of condition

has a certain

of the "Aesthetic,"

the idea that the empirical

being a possible

hopefully,

for further

of the empirical

under which we have labored.

than perceived

This approach,

with the terminology

illusion

It is a very special

approach towards explicating

of time.

provide a more illuminating

First,

of time.

to attempt a different

the idea of the empirical
will

of the convention _

think we thereby solve our problem concerning

the empirical

I would like

The adoption

they wst

be filled,

be

since only

19

then may they be perceived
means the possibility

the terminology

(It being assumed that their

moments requires

tt is more in accord

of being perceived).

o~ the "Aesthetic"

the existence

of time, or any part

of it,

existence

to· say that the existence

of objects

consists

since the empirical

in its being a condition

with

of other
reality
of

· objects.
The existence

successive

of a manifold of time, that is, a manifold of

mome
nts requires

ances which occupies
moments is successive

t1E.

The . empirical

the

successive

of a manifold of appear-

moments. But the manifold of

if they are part of one numerically

only

reality

case with the succession)

that

the existence

of this numerical identity

requires

an .object

is just this

sort

(as was the

liihich bears this

1s, something which is permanent, or, at least,

identical

condition,

relatively

of argument which I think Kant had 1n . mind in these

obscure opening .remarks of the "First

Analogy,"

"Thus the time in which all change of appearances has
to be thought, remains and does not change. For it is
. that in whlch, and as determinations of which, succession
New time cannot
or co-existence can alone be represented.
by itself be perceived.
Consequently, there must be found
in the obj ects . of perception, that is, in the ap~~ances,
the substratum which represents time -in general,"

JO!,

B225.

so.

It

20

II.
Our final

conclusion

of the first

of a permanent object

reality

identity

in the succession

the empirical

reality

the necessary

conditions

Consequently,

of its states)
We shall

of a permanent object

and support for Kant's proo.f of the existence

of

to his proof as transcendental

of matter is a necessary

of experience,

condition

Now concerning these necessary

we will argue from two propositions
The empirical

section

in

proof of the ex1s.tence of matter 1s one which

shows that the existence

reality

considered

1n the first

of time is a necessary

of the
condit-ions,
section:

condition

of

of experience,

The empirical

reality

of the empirical

a permanent object

of a permanent object

reality

We will now seek the necessary

ultimately,

reality

of

into

to

A transcendental

condition

now attempt an inquiry

as an attempt

nature,

2.

condition

that any such object must be matter in space,

Recall that Kant refers

the possibility

its numerical

is · a necessary

of the empirical

matter,

1.

which retains

cne may as well regard this

explanation

possibility

chapter was that the empirical

(an object

of time,

with the hope of finding

offer

MATTER

of the possibility

of time.

conditions

(understanding

is a necessary

of the empirical

that these necessary

of experience).

reality

conditions

of
are,

Three more propositions

are assumed:

3. The permanent object must exist
4.

The permanent object

5. All possible

objects

inner sense or outer sense.

in time.

must be a possible
of perception

object

are either

of perception.
objects

of

21

We will attempt
space, that

1s, material

basic form,
or outside

to demonstrate

in nature.

The permanent object
me (outer

me (i.e.,

outside

sense).

"Refutation

which the term "matter"
the case with "time,"

of this argument (1.e.,

possesses
"matter"

into the nature
chapter.

1.
objects

Our strategy,
a four-fold

in an attempt
To present

material object

J.
dictions

4.

it must be

of matter,

then,

1n Kant's

To present

framework.
of diverse

An especially

presentation

of the

is this:
with respect

the purely material

to material
aspect.

wherein the relation

of the

is explained.
alleged

contra-

of matter.

the 2nd edition

four aspects

of

which is the subject

some remarks aimed at reconciling

I begin my efforts

crucial

some insight

the "4th Parallogism"

doctrine

As is

but will provide

distinction

to consciousness

To present

the meaning

between matter and consciousness.

to isolate

proof of the existence

identifying

has a long history

of the causal relation

To offer

2.

1n the Kantian

here will not only facilitate

proof of the existence

third

sense)

Second Edition

to clarify

and commonuse.

of the relation

Closer considerations
Kant's

be in me (inner

be in me, hence,

we will attempt

scientific,

is that

must either

in space).

of Idealism"),

philosophical,

must be in

Our argument will take this

It can't

Before the presentation

issue

that the permanent object

"Refutation"

which contains

of matter,
to expose what is meant by "matter .. by
of any given material

object.

the

22

A.

The object

~

as it is for

In describing

the object

as it 1s for pµre thought

what must be true of any object
conditions
ditions

of pure thought,

of pure thought

question,

thought,

if it 1s to conform to the necessary

An object

conforms to the necessary

con-

When we answer the

simply in being thought.

"what is the object

we identify

as it 1s for pure thought,"

we generate

the concept of an object-in-general,

The pure concept of an object-

in-general

to the transcendental

is the necessary

apperception,
subject

as it is for pure thought

The object

to which certain

types of predicates

pure thought

of the object

thought

the object

that

is identified,

Deduction"

from the premise that
of the object

1n unity

consciousness).

This,

1n fact,

categories,

constitutes

In this

"I,"

The
(the

or, what is ordinarily
of a judgment through
in unity. ·

or represented

Deductio n" Kant argues the categories

is contained

with a single
it is said,
judgment),

deduction."

to represent

"I" (i.e.,
necessarily

It argues
the manifold

in a single
involves

validity

self-

judgment (It,

hence. the form of judgment,

manner the objective

are

In the "Transcendental

the • objective

it must be possible

of

is simply a

the representation,

forms of judgment in general.
there

unity

be attributed.

llUSt

and the representation

In the "Metaphysical
necessary

involves

is being thought,

termed self-consciousness)
which the object

correlate

i.e.,

the

of the categories

1s claimed to be proven.
B.

The object

as it is for sensation.

In describing

the object

as it is for sensation

one describes

the

-
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object as it is presented
perceiving

subject.

in everyday experience

It is a description

you and you alone.

The properties

of the object

even the psychological

subject.
essentially
"Socrates"
light

state

private,

or, subjective.

and "Friends"

of the fact that

to every perceiver.

perspective,

of the individual

as it is for sensation

The object

as it is for

of the object as it is for sensa-

tion are very much dependent on the physiology,
perhaps,

to the individual

is,

perceiving

in all

Recall Plato's

and

its detail,

Theatetus

where

wonder what it means to know the object

in

one and the same object appears differently

Was Protagoras

right?

Recall the Heraclitean

judgment that no man can step into the same river

twice (or even once).

The world as it is for sensation

world.

It is that

alone.

It is also

ia a solipsistic

particular

flux which occupies your consciousness

the object

of naive commonsense.

C.

The object

as it is for intuition.

In describing
properties

the object

dependent upon the contingencies

aa it is for intuition
which is constituted
considered

solely

occupies a certain
entirely

position

of relations.

It is Kant's

we ignore those

of physiology.

in terms of spatio-temporal

as it is for everyone.
object

as it is for intuition,

"matter."

The object

in time and space

When the object
location

is

it is considered

It is the phenomenal

with which Kant would hope true science should concem itself.

What is asserted
independently

of the object as it is for intuition

of the empirical

Hence, its properties

is true or false

nature of any perceiving

are such that no consciousness

subject.

(possessed

with

the forms of space a.nd ·time) of the object will
properties

(e.g.,

pendently

to the object

pendently

of any :particular

the object

in

of the object

abstraction

as it is in itself

of s.ense.

object,

The thought

to the point

of lacking

unless

(I have no intention
aa unimportant
Tel.igions

and ethical

likewise,

interaction

of a self

are in themselves,

criticizes.

It may be thought,

representations,

extension

and then accuse

of categories,

as analogical,

Kant of

It is
to his

to the distinction

existence,

and,

If one wishes to picture

generated

neither

by the dynamic

of which a.re known as they
the sort of metaphysics,

which he so brilliantly

one w:U1 be in good company,

not known,

of noumenon,

mental and material

and an object,

(no correspond ·ing .

as it is important

thought

of expe ri ence as an effect

is

the pure thought of an

It is irrelevant

thought.

real and imaginary

Kant's notion

significance

the doctrine

critical

between inner and outer sense,

illicit

real

through schema understood

of considering

to Kant's

and the physiological

as it involves

insofar

the possibility

of the object as it is in itself

it has a formal significance.

nor even imagined,

inde-

regarding

involves

from those representations,

structure

though,

are attributed

(noumenon),

a.epends on the form of intuition

intuition),

inde-

consciousness.

of which,

indeterminate

to the object

as it is for sensation)

The -object as it is in itself
The . thought

These

it,

but (lJ.?llike properties

of consciousness-in-general,

attribtzted

D.

· are not attributed

location)

contradict

but, nevertheless,

or

uncovers and
wrong,

The
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very dualism (of self and object)

on which such an interpretation
doubted by Kant), 1

based 1s explicitly

With these distinctions
In this

in mind, let us turn to the "4th Parallogism."

section a proof of the existence

spite of the failure

its initial

is

In

of matter is offered,

of the proof, the 18,Ssage is important because of

statements

on the relation

of matter to consciousness-in-

general.

4th Parallogism
In the "4th Parallogism"

referred
implicitly

to as the first
refers

second edition
affecting
logical

there · is contained what is commonly

edition refutation

of idealism.

Kant

to it as such when he mentioned in the preface to the

that "the only addition,

strictly

so-called,

the method of proof only, is the new refutation
idealism, •• 112 ·The."old"re~utation

though one
of psycho-

is without doubt the

argument of the "4th Parallogism."
Kant's fluid

use of the term "idealism"

help to set some distinctions

out.

1a concerned with the proposition

immediately perceived

deny the existence

lK
_, AJ58.

2K,Bxl.

\,

AJ69.

and it will ·

In the "4th Parallogism"

Kant

that outer appearances cannot be

(hence, their

maintain this are called

is notorious

idealists.

of outer objects

existence
Explicitly
(e.g.,

is doubtful).

Those who

excluded are those who

Berkely). 3 Those who admit

the possibility

of external

hence, maintain

ceived,

and our sensibility"

then,

rendered.

space and time exist

are transcendental

have a cause,

is

or his

belief

certain

realists.

Locke does at least

~ument

realists.

i ndependently
4

theological

did matter not exist,
exists.

that the ideas in us must

object.

The weakness of the

by Berkeley and Hume, Descartes,

that outer objects

notorious

God would be a liar.

and d ogma.tic idealism.

existence

of obj ects

or to be false

AJ69.

-·
-·

~ AJ69.
6K B274.

Material

in space outside

hence,

distinction

in the second

idealism,

problematic

us to be merely doubtful

the latter,

defini-

idealism"

ideal.ism "declares

a."l.dimpossible."

of Descartes,

There is an important

-·

a liar,

God isn't

th ((,n he drops it in favor of "e mpirical

idealism,

idealism

has a

argu.1nent which amounts to the claim that

edition refuta ti on the r e is mention of material

indemonstrable

in spite

cannot be immediately perceived

a term which must be ta.ken as synonomous. 5 Finally,

4K

too,

Now no soonE;!rdoes Kant offer ·a straightforward

or "idealism,"

problematic
6
Berkeley.

may be

an argument intended to render

offer

is the material

well ➔.xposed

idealists,

Notable examples are Locke

of outer objects;namely

and this

of "us

Supposedly,

In each case, however, some qualification

the existence

certain

tion

that

are also transcendental

and Descartes.

•tter

obj e cts which cannot be immediately per-

the
and

The former is the
the dogma.tic idealism

which the phrase

"refutation

of

of ·
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idealism"

obscures.

a certain

doctrine

It is one thing to refute the premises upon which
It is quite another to

of idealism is .grounded,

px.,ove to the contrary,

that matter in space exists.

Nowthe 4th

pa.:rallogism is an argument · intending to prove that the existence
Jll!l'-tteris doubtful.

A successful

only involve a refutation

c:r.lticism 1n itself

of this prallogism

involve concluding,

not the case that the existence
case that matter exists."

to the contrary,

of matter is doubtful,"

of idealism,"

can be immediately perceived

which led to all

sorts

"bundles of perceptions,"

this

suggesting

is what is 1n us.

would probably be

of shocking results

1n space,

7K, AJ72-J.

~

that·

that

a popular pre·al.ike

("ideas sent by God,"

"monism," "windowless monads," "occasional.ism").

that the externality
its materiality,

idealism"

as a means

The key to Kant's insight

havoc-wreaking notion,

the existence

This

and rationalists

the ambigµity in the expressions

Kant realized
existence

might also

perceived because all

to Kant to offe~ his "transcendental

1n revealing

is the

on the commondoctrine

of the day shared by empiricists

o~ destroying

or, "it

is

of the title.

outside us cannot be immediately

It 1n1.sleft

It

that "it

assertions

in fact,

The argument .of the parallogism rests

supposition

This

of idealism,"

Proof of these latter

be considered. a "refutation

objects

need

of a premise upon which it is based,

might be called a ":refutation

vou1d not necessarily

mon deserving

criticism

of

"in us" and "outside

of the object,

that is,

lay
us." 7

its

could quite well be posited without

of an unperceivable

entity

persisting

--
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independently
that

of consciousness-in-general.

For when it

1s asserted

only what 1s "in us" can be illlmediately perceived,

be taken

ness.

in the transcendental

But when matter

· Yet even so far as it

possible

tion,

object

or content

in space is said to be "outside

in a completely

be taken

sense as object

different

it 1s, 1n fact

is 1n space,

of consciousness,

"outside

Locke, then,
be directly

The problematic

us,"

is .merely representa-

"1n us," -but

idealism

of Descartes

predecessors

and

in space can't

This in turn was grounded on the belief

perceived,

own transcendental

1s, 1n space.

must be, a

was grounded on the notion that something

was transcendentally

space

1t 1n to

that

it

for space itself

of conscious-

us,"

(empirical } sense,

Hence, space and matter are transcendentally

empirically

"in us" is to

By asserting,

real.

to the contrary,

Kant removed the illusion

idealism,

that

his

under which his

had labored.

But we must now ask

ourselves

what has. been established?

The

paral.logism has been exposed as employing a middle term -equivocally,
We can perfectly

ceived,

that

well speak of matter

is, there

space is .yet in us,
prevalent

is no contradiction

Kant has devastated

argument against

to the existence

the possibility

that

matter

with the nature of matter
still

consistently

be outer

.

are,

maintain

in fact,

in asserting

the most formidable
of certainty

constructed

exists,

that

it~

that

inventions

and

with respect
But it still

which would establish

Even granted
direct1y

t~at

it

_perceivable,

all such representations
of the illagin&tion,

per-

what is 1n

that

That is a good da,y·'s work.

of matter.

rema.ins for an argument tobe
doubt the fact

in space - as being directly

beyond

is · 1n accord
one may
which seem to

Kant's

answer to

29

this

ie perfectly

cation

truth

clear,

entirely

plausible,

which would provide the absolute
should have,

are impossible

yet lacking

any justifi-

1n

any philosophical

certainty

Kant argues that even imaginary and dreamed objects

apart

from the perception

that the a posteriori

of matter,

elements of such inventions

invented but must be provided 1n perception,

His contention

is

cannot themselves

be

Hence, inventions

consist

in the rea.rrange111ent of basic elements already provided in previous
perceptions
contents

(an argument reminiscent

of Locke),

of imaginary representations

antecedently

in experience

demonstrate

That . the . elementary

must have been perceived

is a plausible

Though the refutation

8

but unacceptable

proposition,

of the pa.rallogism is insufficient

the existence

of matter,

to

an important

it contains

contribu-

tion which Kant has made concerning the problem of the relation
and consciousness.

1s "in us,"

Matter may be both in space and "in us,"

Those who have difficulty

1s "in us" might find,

upon closer

curious about th e idea that
one takes a li ~eral

space is "outside

whole issue becomes obscure,

"in

of its being an object
In light

aif' Kant's

In either

case, if

metaphor, then the

of our consciousness,

issue.
Space is

apart from the possibility

for consciousness-in-general,
analysis

or, the outer wo:rld is directly

8 .

us,"

There is here a purely logical

us" if it is an idea with no existence

space

something equally

of the spatial

Space is "in us•• if it is .a content

if space

swallowing the idea that

examination,

interpretation

of matte :r

!,, A'.374, AJ75, AJ77.

we may return

perceived.

to the view that matter,

On the other hand, 1n spite

30

of this

return to normalcy, it ought not

of a:ny representation

say that the outer reality
known or determined

be thought

through :perception.

that Kant means to

can be immediately

Kant says in the frolegomenas

"Whenan appearance is given us, we are still quite
as to how we should judge the matter ·. The .
appearance depends upon the senses, but the judgment
upon the understan ding; and the only question is whether
in the determination
of the object there is truth or
not. But the difference between truth and dr~ming is
not ascertained
by the nature of the representations
which are referred to objects (for they are the same
in both cases), but by their connection according to
those :rules which determine the coherence of the representations
in the concept of an object ••• "9
free

The empirical
appearance is real
sidering

problem is that of determining
or not.

The philosophical

what the difference

whether a given

problem is one of con-

is between illus.ion and reality.

It is a

problem, and, even asswn.i.ng it solved, the practical
·
10
problem of ma.king such judgments in a :particular case remains . unaffected • .

purely theoretical

Even a Kantian
This

may be drawn

being

was inclined

towards the notion that the objectivity
consisted

generally,

with the totality

"incoherent."

nevertheless,
bankruptcy
rationalist

oasis.

,·

so, what advance has Kant made? Empiricist

appearance

and

to a non-ex1$tent

real.

in its

of a ~icular

coherence wJth other appearances,
of eXJ>erience.

Some people are unruly
The "critical

of empiricist

philosophy

Illusions

were "unruly"

and. incoherent,

philosophy"

and, more

has rejected

but they are,
the :rational

thought without succumbing to the dogmatism of

thought.

9rmma.nuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any FutU-.""8Metaphysics,
L. w. Beck
translator,
(New Yo:rk: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, . Inc ·., 1950), p. JS.
lO!, AJ76.
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While Kant wa.s willing

certain

to a.dlllit that the "strangeness"

appearance might provide good grounds for refusing

it is real,

or material

constituted

its

in nature,

irreality,

of a
to believe

he would deny that this

"strangeness"

Kant simply maintained that an appearance

wasreal

if it was in space, and not real if 1t wasn •t,

tinction

was ma.de without going beyond the possibility

Serious problems, yet, arise
expresses his transcendental

of consciousness.

from the particular

idealism.

And this dis-

way in which Kant

On the one hand, there

is this

sort of statement:
"This permanent cannot, however, be something in me, ••.
Thus perception of this permanent is possible only
through a thing outside me and not through the mere
representation
of a thing outside me,,.representations
themselves require a permanent distinct from them, ~
relation to which their change·,. ,may be determined."
On

the others
"External objects (bodies), however, are mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of my
representations,
the objects of which are something
only through these 1~epresentations.
Apart from them
they ·are nothing,"
The first

Idealism."

statement

comes froa the second edition

It sounds very different

second one, which comes from the first
Paraliogism.")

H.

second edition

w. B.

statement.

AJ70,

statements,

"Refutation"

of

like the
(i.e.,

two interpretations

"4th

of the

He says that some see in it the "abandonthat our knowle~e

not of things by themselves."

11
K, B275.
l~

edition

Joseph identifies

ment of the fundamental doctrine
appearances,

from earlier

"Refutation

1s only of

Others (N, K. Smith 1n
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particular),

he says,

existence
give

of material

"sees

in its

nature'

'realistic

the ripening

to the critical

philosophy

its

We must reject

the notion

that

object,

or matter,

fundamental
perfectly

clear

Kant states

the problem

In all

that

matter

explicitly

that

Even if

it

a supposed

phenomenalism.15

real

of the germinal

To say this

is phenomenal,

in the two passages
continual

wavering

Something

should

which holds

Kant changed his mind many times

the Critique~

or erase
that

Kant,

preferable
very well

at times,

in the earlier

used identical

to the "patchwork"
have been intended

on Kant by shortness

and

the idea of the "patchwork

Pure Reason and simply

what was written

which re-

here of Kemp Smith's

• . He works with

writing

remains.

contradication

of interpretation
that

but phenomenal,

between subjectivism
be said

his most

in itself.14

of both editions

a simple

didn't

parts.

for exegetical

bother

I submit

of

to retract

the hypothesis

It is,

The fluid

method

theory"

in the course

terms differently.

hypothesis.

13

not not.1i-nena.l.

is not noumenal,

the statements

11

Kant makes it

is not a thing
matter

which

the material

would contradict

too many instances

that

ideas

and value.

Kant here means that

matter

is conceded

of the independent

originality

as substance

of reconciling

N.K. Smith sees
flects

is noumenal.

teaching.

theory

I think,

use of terms may

purposes,

and also

forced

of time.16

13H.W.B. Joseph, A Comparison of Kant's Idealism with that of
Berkeley,
(London: Humphrey Milford Amen House, E.C., 1929) XV, p. 4.

14K, A360, A373-4, A379, A359.
lSN.k.
(New Ycrk:

Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique
Humanities Press, 1950), pp. 212-321.

16K, Bxliii-xliv.

of Pure Reason,
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•

With the distinctions

of the first

we should be able to offer

It seems natural

some beginnings

permanent is still

We might attain

is,

matter).

a clearer

and a material

statement

tree,

Whether in me or outside

or objective

but not the tree

state

of affairs.

distinction

itself.

relevant

(a position

to

is aware-

of affairs,

Locke and Descartes

through a sort -of camera theory

It makes sense, really,
thing

state

aware of a. picture

This is the transcendental

in space.

Descartes viewed the mind as such.

and Descartes

on the idea of the

supposing both a mental or subjective

mind is an individual

me,

Supposing the awareness of a

The mind, as it were, is directly

Kant rejects.

meJ

of Kant's notion of the rela-

by focusing

say, a tree.

object,

seemed to understand. this
analogy.

outside

Let us suppose, as an example, _that there

ness of a material
tree entails

(empirically)

(the kind of representations

of appearances

discussion).

re-

representation.

tion of matter and consciousness

this

toward a reconciliation.

in me. There are representations

double-nature

in mind,

from them, he is speaking of representations

namely, the permanent (that
the

refutation

enough to think ~~at when he says representations

quire a permanent distinct

empirically

edition

of the

realism

only on the supposition
Of course,

Referring

neither

which

that the

Locke nor

to the position

of Locke

shared with Berkeley and Hume), N. K. Smith

sa.ysc

"Knowledge is viewed as a process entirely internal to
the individual mind, and as carrying us further only in
virtue of some additional
supervening precess, inferential,
conjectural,
or instinctive.
This subjectivism . also tends

to combine with a view of cons cio usness -as an ultimate
self-revea ~ g property of a purely in dividual
existence. »
·

7

For Kant both the merital and the material
within the awareness

of the appearance.

Recall the distinction

'
between
the obj e ct as it is for sensation

intuition.

In that

intuition

as distinct.

of thought.

But it was a logical

nor did they f.ollow one another

contained

in the -singular

of the appe arance

correlated
objective

to the unity

status

is constituted

by the fact

of apperception

at a certain

by the fact

space at a certain

time.

The appearance,

side-by-side

They were both

awareness of the appearance.

is constituted

and the
a. distinction

did not exist
in time.

drawn

as it is for

dist.inction,

and the intuition

in space,

status

and the object

we could speak of the sensation

context

The sensation

were to be found

state

The subjective

that · it is
time.

Its

that it has a position

in

then, is both 1n the mind and

1n spa.ee.

When we acknowledge that the appearance
adllit as being out side us?

We admit as objective

o-f the appearan ce which exist

not independently
sy consciousness

independently

1.7

of

·

of consciou sness in _general.
and consciousne s s~in-general

nor presupposes , the distinction
o-f others.

To say the appearance

.

1s outside

between
(object)

my

my

18

only those aspects
consciousness,

though

The distinction

is neither
personal

exists

us, what do we ·

self

between

the same as,
and the selves

· independently

of

my

N. K. Smith, ! Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure __Reason,
(New York: Humanities
Press, 195 0;, pp. 272-3. ·
18 Immanue1 Kant , Prolegomena
.
L ~ •.
,
k
to Any Future Metaphysics,
n. Bee
translator,
(New York: The Bobbs- Merrill
Company, Inc., 1950), p. ~8.
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consciousness

means the numerically

through other representations

identical

object may be apprehended

(which may or may not be qualitatively

at a time which· may or may not be different.

identical)

Representations

of outer sense are unique in that a manifold of them may all be manifestations

of one numerically

identical

I •Y see one and the same tree,
qualitatively
tions

different

of objects

imagine a tree,
qualitatively

representations

of inner sense.

regardless
identical,

can be ascribed

neither

It is not possible

(nuaerically

identical)

conditions

exists

f~r

consciousness

as 1t 1s for intuition),

ntURerical identity,

(e.g.,

as

situation

of

same

are lacking.

involves no contradiction.

(e.g.,

the object
of

object for consciousness-in-general.
from representations

is distinct

from representation

(in me)
in

that matter 1s a species of a representaWhenwe admit the consciousness

in space we admit two facts.

time.

For

the object as it is for sensation)
The outer object

is a possible

at a certain

a numerical identity

because it possesses the conditions

Hence, to say also,

apprehended

nor outer reality

for you to apprehend.the

alone.

it is not implied that natter

object

cannot

appearances are

is the spatial-temporal

When Kant speaks of matter as distinct

general.

relation

If we agree to close our eyes and

of numerical identity

the inner object
my

similar

inner object that I apprehend, for the necessary

of the possibility

reason,

A

numerical identify

identity,

if our representa-

(appearances),

What makes possible

the object.

tion

of the fact that we have

of whether our respective

to them.

opposed to qualitative

this

in spite

occupy the same place at the same time.

be said

·For example, you and

object.

It is a fact that the object

The temporal determina.tion;

here,

of an
is

belonga to tbe apprehension,

reality,

which this

fact

the apprehension,

the object

not the object .,. hence, the empirical

is not that of" the object,

indicates,

The other fact

to be admitted

( in apace and time).

It,

is the existence

too, has its own position

We JllUSttake note of the role which the spatiality
in constituting

plays

suffice

its objectivity.

for objectivity?

For one

Whywouldn't

reason,space

temporality

is the form of all
explanation.

If we are to suppose that 1¢at is apprehended 1n a single
ness exists

apart f+0m that consciousness

11Ust suppose

object

But in that

is apprehended.

only qualitative

That it · fits

identity.

identical

is to know they exist

To know that

identity

the

description

indicates

does not constitute

.

truth.

intuition

Rather

spatio-temporal
required

·.

location

to render the formal .

serviceable.

space" with what is "outside
intuition,

19

it is being

Hopefully this argument provides reason for identifying

1s the form of outer

same

in the same place at the same time.

as an analytical

provide the corresponding

me), then we

'bro objects a.re numerically

that only the idea of identical

concept of numerical

sue'

Indiscernabllity

identity,

is not offered

the

conscious-

1n a different

case how are we to know that

numerical

suggested

(1.e ·.., outside

that the same object my be apprehended

consciousness.

"in

in

of the object

This however is not a ver,- revealing

outer intuition.

can

of

and time.

space

'Ibis

but

me.~

what is

Rather than ass'lll~ing that

we :f'lnd that

what 1s "outside

us"

space

37

(i.e.,

objective)

identity

must satisfy

in dif'f'e:rent
a.nd that

in-general),

the necessary

consciousnesses
this

greater detail
At this

This connection

point

that of Berke1ey.

it

table

I see and the table

I feel

20

situation

of there

with

and, in so

being a numerical

Within Berkeley's

system the

are not one and the same.

Likewise,

I see and the table you see cannot be numerically

identical,

:Berkeley manages to salvage the distinction
the objective
subjective

a

is argued for in

the idea of matter,

conditions

appearances.

of ascribing

to compare Kant's

Berkeley eliminates

among different

the table

Individuals.

is interesting

doing, elimina. -tes the necessary
identity

.

in P. F, Strawson's

of numerical

(an object for consciousness-

involves the po:;;sibility

(and temporal) . location.

spatial

conditions

without

between the subjective

the notion of matter by maintaining

ideas are produced by us, whereas objective

and

that

ones are caused

by God.

Now what 1s the problem with Berkeley's
Kant woul d have quite

place,

significance

of ~erkeley's

seeJllS to be a t ranscendent
subtle

line

•Refutation
numerical

of .attack.

temporal deterninations,

2 ~.
Pa.rt I.

F. Skawson,

In the first

a bit to say about the legitimacy
extension
object.

and

of the category

of cause to what

But I am interested

in a more

. It is the argument of the se .cond edition

of Ideal ism" that
iden t ity)one

system?

if one does away with matter

also does away with the possibility
hence, ultimately,

Individuals,

renders

(consequently,
of ma.king

experience

(Londons Methuen

&

i mpossible.

Co, Ltd, 1961),

38

•

The Second Edition
Let us first
representation.

"Refutation

recapitulate

of Idealism"

a few pointsi

Matter is a kind of

We may admit the objectivity

and independence of

matter (an independence of any particular
admitting the existence

of anything independently

•

identity

in different

of this

is existence

consist

in the fact that possible

spatial

relations

in intuition.

posited

..and the necessary

consciousnesses,
in space.

The empirical
appearances

Hence the spatial

relations"

turn to Kant's proof for the existence
Kant begins with this
"I am conscious

indubitable,

therefore,

2!,B275.

consciousness.

should

which any appearance,

21

consciousness.

as determined
statement

We now

1n time."

22

and Descartes•

in his proof for the existence
I am."

but

of matter.

of my own existence

of matter;

In each case the philosopher

namely,

assumes as

In neither

for the sake of the argument to understand

21A. H. Smith, Kantian Studies.,
1~7), pp. 7-8.

2

with

of appearances

what my be termed, his own existence.

is it necessary

of matter must

propositions

A comparison may be drawn between this
assumption

condition

are possessed

reality

even imagined ones, has for the individual

"I think,

reality

a numerical

of the appearance is not given in sensation

not be confused with the "spatial

initial

of the possibility

which are the same for all possible

reality

without

The 111a.terialobject retains

of consciousness-in-general.

The spatial

consciousness)

this

{Londons Oxford University

case
as

Press,

J9

m.ea.ning there
did,

Descartes

probably,

an important

though,

the self,

substantial

difference.

Whereas Descartes

Kant starts

from the fact

crucial

or noumenal self,

have substantiality

:in mind).

Descartes

Kant assumes the existence

1n time.

this

is a permanent,

starts

(though

There is,

assumes the existence

at a certain

of the self

of .

point

from the fact of self-consciousness,

of inner experience.

Kant, himself,

notes

distinction:

"But 1n the above proof it has been shown that outer
experience is really immediate, and that only by
means of 1t is inner experience -- not indeed the
consciousness
of my own existenc , but the determination of it in time -- possible." 2
·
.
Solll8 commentators

to . clearly

mark the pitfall,

Bounds of Sense,

that

Analytic)

point and I think

Strawson,

the "Refutation"

of the possibility

conditions

(Kant's

have missed this

for example, says,

of self~consciousness."

Bennett

questions

pitfalls.

We rely

to measure the flow of time.

1s not at all. what Kant is talking

on gr .ounds that

24

makes the same error.

permanent objects

Experience)

in The

is "concerned with the general

We might do well to point out other possible
on relatively

it is worthwhile

about,

Prof,

But this

Walsh (Reason and

Kant's argument for the existence

of a permanent

it does not help us to measure the flow of time.

26

23r<
_, B277.
24P. F. Strawson,
1966), p. 1:25.. ·
25 Jonathan
University

Press,

26w. H.
1~7),

Bennett,
1966),

The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen
Kant's Analytic
p. 203.

Walsh, Reason ~ Experience
p. 147.

&

Co, Ltd,

(Cambridgez Cambridge
(0:xford.1 Clarendon Press,
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What must be made clear
is not offered
time,

as a necessary

but rather,

measurability,
of the possibility

of a permanent

for measuring

condition

after

reality

all,

the flow of

for the empirical

the existence,

which Kant takes

reality

not the

to be a necessary

condition

of experience,

there

perhaps,

respect

condition

It is,

of time,

Finally

the empirical

as a necessary

of the flow of time.

which,

is that

are some difficulties

owe their

origin

to the perceivability

with Paton's

exposition,

he took earlier

to the approach

with

of time.

"The permanence of substance is presupposed by
experience,
and so is known a priori;
but we must be
able to find the permanent in actual experience and
11
to discover examples of it by ordinary observation,
27
The assertion

that

to mean "established")
whole of Kantian
be established

permanence
by ordinary

thought,

runs counter

empirically,

Paton's

is verified

in our observations

further

to the

empirically

What can be established

established

quite

observation

What can be established

a priori,

(and I take this

can be discovered

cannot

a priori

cannot

that

permanence

assertion

of impenetrability

or resistance

be

is

misleading.28
Hume had long before

demonstrated

was Hume's arguments

and it
different

elaborates
through

approach
quite

(i.e.,
nicely

observation,29

the inadequacy

which enabled
transcendental

on the inability
Bennett's

approach,

Kant to see the need for a
logic).

Prof.

to establish

argument

that

Bennett
permanence

across-time

27H.J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience,
Macmillan Co., 1936), Vol. I, p. 98.
281bid.,

of this

identity

(New York:

The

p. 207.

29Johnathan Bennett, Kant 1 s Dialectic,
University
Press, 1974), p. 105.

(Cambridge:

Cambridge
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cannot be established

through empirical

the contention

means does not, however,

mitigate

against

identity

across time, nor, that this can be established

To returp to the Refutation

that there is something which ret&ina
a priori.

itself:

"All determination of time presupposes soIT'.ething
permanent in perception.
This permanent cannot,
however, be something in me, since it 1s only through
this permanent that my existence in time can itself
be determined."30
·

The need for a permanent has already been considered

of this thesis,

seeti.on
If,

and is argued for by Kant in the "First

Kant can show that the perception

then,

impossible,

me, that is,

must be outside

Kant asserts
permanent.

of the perception

in space . (for we already

of a permanent is possible,

ception

Analogy."

of a perma.."lent in me is

he will have proven the possibility

permanent outside

in the first

of a

know the. per-

and that if it is not in me, it

me)•

repeatedly

His reasons,

that in inner irttuition

there is nothing

however, vary •

.. In inner intuition
there 1s nothing permanent, for
the "I" is merely the consciousness of my thought." 31
Surel.y

the fact that the "I" is merely the consciousness

does not itself

imply that in inner intuition

Kant is here anticipating

resentation

"I" to be a permanent intuition.

deny its permanence.

JOK, B275.

3~,

B41J.

'Iff:/

thought

is nothing permanent.

that some might think the indeterminate

grounds that it is not an intuition
expl.lcitly

there

of

a.t all.

He rejects

this

rep-

on the

He does not, however,

In another i:assage he expresses

42

reservation
separate

tomµ-ds
from that

a. special,

referring

to the "I" as a'oiding,

of whether

indeterminate

it

is an intuit.ton,

an issue

quite

a concept,

er merely

· signification.

"For in what we call 'soul'
everythi. "lg is - 1n continual
-flux and there is nothing abiding except {i:f we must
olely
so express ourselves)
the 'I' ·'Which is simple
because its representation
has no content ••• " 32·
In another

idea of its

:i:assage Kant recognizes

be1:ng abiding

(permanent)

the distinction
and its

between the
invariably

being

present.

•The 'I' is indeed in all thoughts,
but t .here is not
1n this representation
the least trace of intuition,

· distinguishing
the 'I' from other objects of intuition.
Thus we can ; indeed perceive that this representation
1s invariably
present 1n all thought, but . not that it
1s an abiding a.hd continuing
intuition,
wherein the
,s being transitory,
give place ' to one
thoughts:
3 .
-another.
.
There

&.-e · two

the .. I" provides

the required

Smith expresses
that

notion

approaches

the:m quite

content

well

approach.

at all.

In the first

place,

object

because

it is not g1 ven 1n intuition

fragile

distinction

. "spontaneity

in intuition,

the notion

the time-order,

work.~

rejection

on the grounds

o·f the

not because it
places

Prof.

. One can reject

are soEe reasons

between the "receptivity

of thought."

in refuting

intuition

But there

abiding

given

for

in his

"r- is a. :permanent

the

1s not an intuition

this

one can take

for

A. H,
the

that

it

foregoing

"I" as being an

is not abiding,

too much weight
of sense"

Why does time require

that

but

on the

and the

a "given"

permanent

32K A'l81~
-·

.I

3Jic
_, AJ50.
~A. H. S'Illith, Kantian

1~7);

pp. 39-40.

Studies,

(Londons Oxford University

Press,
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.rather

than a "supplied"

permanent?

out as being a permanent intuition
a permanent in me still

of consciousness
variably

Secondly,

in me the possibility

remains.

For example, there

inference

things

is invariably

or

were you not the same

to be invalid,

of its truth

remains. 35 · It is also possible

datum (e.g.,

a pain)

might be present

A more fundamental

being

is the argument that you would

not remember what happened to you yesterday
Kant shows this

of there

One might argue for the permanence

1n which the "I" among other

present.

person.

even 1:f the "I" is ruled

that

throughout

approach involves

yet the possibility
some concrete

sense-

one's experience.

the recognition

that neither

the "I" ·nor anything

in . me can provide the permanence required

for the

tlme-order because,

not being in space, they lack the conditions

of

mmerical . identity.

The idea of numerical

the id.ea of permanence.

identity.

It was after

by the existence

That · which persists
all

of time.

which retains

an object

identity

"numerical
"_Pe~ence"

_identity

retains

identity"

is intrinsic

to

its numerical

which was demanded

became involved only because

. across time has permanence.

That this approach is so1,1nd, and that Kant had it in mind are
issues.

separate

I tend to think that he did, but not all

In one passage he explicitly

to a permanent,

_relation

"Amphiboly" section
suggested

-

'.36
K,

A'.381..

J?K, A26J4.

that only what is outer can have

but, he me~ly asserts

he has a little

that two objects

3-\, A'.364.
.

asserts

that clearly.

it.3

6 In the

more to sa.y. 37 There it is

may be qualitatively

identical,

but
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numerically

diffe r ent if they have different

and the same time.
space itself,

The numerical difference

he says~

It seems natural

regard the numerical. identity
There is also

of objects

which, I think,

standing of the argument,

:positions

of objects

at one

is given by

to thir'.k that

he woUl.dalso

as being given by space.

an important statement

_of the second edition,

English-speaking

spatial

1n a footnote

to the preface

contains the key to an under-

yet has been :for the most part

ignored

by

commentators.

"The representation
1s not the same as

of something permanent in e~istence
permanent representation.
For though
the representation
of ( someth 1,ng permanent) may be very
transitory .and v~iable like all our other .representa~
t.ions, not excepting ~§ose of matter, it yet refers to
something permanent."
·

Let us take a series
be

referred

that

there

successive
persisted
was another

to as "a continuous
is a certain
state.

its

existence
1n space).

rather

sense-datum

numerical

independent

identity)
represented

in each

state

To assert

of the representation

the
ove·r and

would involve giving

it an

existence

it would involve the existence

of matter.

the "sell"

subje cti,re ·aspect

1n thought

there

(i.e.,

Let us suppose successive

.

identical

the one before?

o~ its occurrence

Consequently,

J9i<
_, Bxll

what might
Suppose

than, · say, in each successive

just like

being invariably

.focus on their

of consciousness."

sense-<iatUII qualitatively

What if' one argues · that

permanent?

stretch

as constituting

What would it mean to say a s1ngle sense-datum

throughout,

permanence (i.e.,
above

of conscious states

can provide the required

representations

we may refer

occur.

If we

to them as successive

45

states

in one time.

of one self

requires

a corresponding

of one's

body to establish

intuition.

from such reference

empty, giving

illusion

rise

(that

the · spectre

Strawson explains

of the unity of experience

self,

matter exists)

of a permanent self.

the idea of a permanent self

to illusion.

as a confusion

for the idea of a ~rmanent

the conclusion

one sought to escape by raising

Yet apart

however,

We cannot employ the permanence

reference

tor that would involve admitting
that

Our idea of "one self",

becomes

the nature

of the

with the experience

af unity.

we are to make any legitimate employment of the
crucial concepts of unity or numerical identity
throughout time, we must apply them, 1n the light of
empirical criteria,
to objects encountered in ·
experience.
But if we abstract entirely from the
body and consider simply our experiences of states
of
consciousness as such (the contents of inner se~se),
it is evident not only that we do not but that we
could not, encounter within this field anything which
we could identify
as the permanent subje~t ·of states
of consciousness.
How, then, does the illusion arise?
A slogan-like
summary of Kant's answer would be the
unity
experience is conf'used with the experience of
"If

unity."

059

_It must
"Refutation,"

self,

but that

Hume, that all
tions.
states

be maintained

for the success of the argument of the

not only that there
there

is no perception

can be no such perception.

introspective

efforts

Kant .realized,

from the transitory

It is the emptiness of the concept of self

39P. F. Strawson,
1966) , p. 37.

~

like

produced only more representa-

The idea of a permanent self distinct
ls empty.

of a permanent

Bounds of Sense, (London, Methuen

which

&

Co, Ltd,
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provides the ba.sis for our assertion
possible

object cf perception.

Let us now consider
aspect as being

states

be given to the idea

representations
.tions

that a permanent self is not a

the successive
of one object.

of a single

of it?

apprehended.

object distinct

qualitative

description
of their
intuition

to .which the representations

the idea of matter in space.

other

intuition

from successive

The successive

through the recognition

We can supply a corresponding

a permanent object

in their

Can a cottesponding

The answer is yes.

are accounted. for thro~

nature, and, further,

representations

representa-

of their

inner

being successively

to the idea of

are related

through
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III.

CAUSALIT!

We turn now from efforts

to the question

of the necessary

Our aim is to establish

matter.

among these necessary
r

hasten our arrival

at this

2.

Two propositions,

is

if assumed, will

condition

of the

of matter.

Ths second proposition

that substance,

in the idea of the first

application

phenomenal reality

of the "critical"

proposition.
doctrine

which

to that which may be object of experience.

is a specific

application

of the general doctrine

as the permanent, is capa.ble of alteration.

Kant will

argue:

3.

Only substance

4.

Matter is the only possible

5.

All material

Our argument,

three

is capable of al teration.

alteration

1

substance. 2

may be reduced to motion. 3

so far as I can see, does not rest on the truth

of these

assertions.

1
K, B233.
2 Imma.nuelKant, Meta
El.11ngton

of

that the concept of causality

of motion is a necessary

It 1s merely a specific

last

of the existence

of matter.

Nothing new is contained

further

of matter

of the experience of matter is a necessary

The possibility

existence

the existence

conclusion,

of the existence

condition

conditions

conditions.

The possibility

1.

limits

to establish

translator,

p.103.
Jibid .• , p. 14.

sical Foundations
of Natural
Science,
New Yorks The Bobbs- Merrill
Company, Inc.,

James

1970),

-
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A necessary

condition

is that

reality,

it,

analysis

condition

the possibility

of matter.

our inquiry thusly:

of the possibility

what can be said of objective

to material

alteration,

In the light

of obje .ctive

succession

or motion, since th~ latter

It is precisely

this question

of motion is
of this

What are the necessary

of the experience

(Naturally,

the former).

object of experience.

of . the · experience

of the existence

we may reformulate

conditions

of motion, as phenomenal

too, must be a possible

Hence, we conclude that

a necessary

of the possibility

succession?

will be applicable
is a species

of

;m1,ch is the topic

of the

is intended to produce synthetieal

rather

"Second Analogy."
Recall that

our enquiry

than analytical.

knowledge.

"the experience

of objective

conditions

An explication

of the possibility

But we are not satisfied

succession"

of :the given concept of
would identify

of the experience

with the generation

necessary

of objective

of tautologies.

than analyze the concept in question,

it is Y..ant's strategy

properties

conditions

which qualify

purely logical

to do, then,

considerations

It will

with that

to add
of

What we are about

but rather,

of one •. Kant, like Aristotle,

to consider

Rather

independently

formal log.ic).

should come at the end of enquiry,

be helpful

conjunction

(i.e.,

is not proceed from a definition.

to the construction

definitions"

as necessary

succession.

believed

contribute
that "real

not at the beginning.

Ka.nt•s notion of "real definition,"

of "possibility."

"I here mean real definition .-- which does not merely
substitute
for the name of a thing other more intelligible
words, but contains a clear property by which the defined

in

object can always be -known with certainty,
and which
makes the explained concept serviceable in application

.• "

4

"Ve demand in every concept, first,
the logical form
of a concept (of thought) in general, and secondly, the
possibility
of giving it an object to which it may be
applied.
In the absence of such object, it has no
mea..,ing and is completely lacking in content, though
it still contains the logical function which is required ... 5
"The possibility
of a thing can never be proved merely
from the fact that its concept is not self-contradictory,
but only th~ugh its being supported by some corresponding
intuition. " 6
Now it is necessary
objective

succession

succession,

It must have in addition

concept be "meaningful"
to a formal sense,

or successive

status,

apprehended

were subjectively
in succession

that A preceded

not that

one object.

presents

and B second.

The concept
no problem.

To say that

points

in time).

\, B2J9.
6
,!, B308

0

To say

representations)

means

But suppose · we say of A and B,
but that,

objectively

Suppose that A and B were states

What would it "mean" to say they were objectively

K, A242.

two

is to say they were

(where A and Bare

one preceded the other.

than co-existent?

4

at different

one ~as apprehended before the other,

speaking,

rather

first,

sense.

succession.

successive

(i.e.,

B subjectively

A was apprehended

of

or "serviceable."

a real

in itself,

Neither does the concept of a subjective
· representations

of the experience

not only that we have a concept of objective

but that this

of succession,

for the possibility

From a purely

of

successive

formal point of view there

is no

-50

problem.

To say A a nd Bare

and Bare

pre dicates

obj ectively

(iu a relation

of succession)

But Kant demands "serviceability"
it

stands

manifold

does not provide
of intuition

the given
Kant,

concept

himself,

us with

the ab i lity

as an objective

the situation

positions

of states

tion where one observes
(parts

other

of

of the house)

recognize

The appearances

the object.

7 Now the serviceability

of an objective

to establish

some supporting

intuition.

the needed support.
of Kant's

point

do not come with

their

that

succession

perspective,
we must be able
intuition

so long as it was an intuition

Professor

Walsh,

in a fi .gurative

time is not perceived,

dates

in

demands a schema

Our supporting

be anything

of the house

in me co-exist

Or, from another

the possibility

of

they recognize

parts

successively

to establish

speaking,

the manifold

of the concept

relation.

that

For in a situa-

and, while

the various

which occur

over and above our formal

The reco gni tion

in succession.

in succession,

they nevertheless

logically

in succession,

than the recognition

a house one may apprehend

co-exist.

events

any possible

of an example

of a boat going down a river.

are apprehended

explanation

as

The inadequacy

where one apprehends,

the manifold

and provided

identify

consideration

something

could,

Our concept

succession.

of motion must involve

fact,

A

provides.

the successive

this

to

that

of the object.

of our concepts.

can be seen through

Kant mentioned

states

successi ve i mplies

stamped on them.a

tells

us t hat

If they did,

7K, B235-7.

8w.H. Walsh~ "Kant .on the Perception
of Time," in Kant Studies
Open Court Publi shing
Today, L.W. Beck editor,
(LaSalle,
Illinois:
1969), p. 160.

Co.,
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the dates,

themselves,

ances are objectively

could provide our . needed intuition.
successive
.

stamped on them, ·and objectively

Unli\{e other empirical

dates.

position

is not sensibly

The empirical
succession

itself,

, argues that

factor
that

Appear-

when they have different

dates

.

co-existent
properties

when they have identical
of objects,

however, temporal

indicated.
which Kant turns to instead

is the subjective

is, the sequence of representations.

saying a manifold of appearance is objectively

means that the order of the sequence of representations

He
successive

is irreversible

or necessary ·. 9 · There is no doubt that the idea of a necessary

of representations

constitutes

a needed corresponding

one swift step bo,th the serviceability
of the "thing"

(i.e.,

the objective

sequence

intuition.

In

of the concept and the possibility
succession)

is established.

One might wonder how we are to know when a sequence of representations

was truly

"irreversible,"

Even if we fail

This, however, is a separate

to answer this ·question ·, we have succeeded in giving

"meaning" to the concept of objective
It still

given.
assert

remains

Exactly

valid

"meaning'' which has been

what are we.committed to when, in this

the sequence of representations

and what is the effect?
synthe •tic

succession.

to make clear this

And how does the concept of causality
~use,

issue,

to be necessary
fit

lni

And precisely

judgment in which the reality

.in time is asserted?

9!, B2)4, B236, B2J8.

context,

we

or irreversible?

What, here,

is the

what is the objectively
of a. necessar.r

connection

52

To begin, Kant wants to say that
successive

perceptions

objective

succession

as constituting

determined by the object
of the object,

the fact

not ma.king a statement

Given that

th" :fact

means, given
of that

particular

be struck

that given apprehension

or representations
as analytic,

argument runs,

dead by -lightning.

it is just1:fied

1 °!£_
Al08, A191.
1

1x,A92.

the

it does

What we wish to say is

And even with this

a. priori,

the sequence
further
We concede

of objective

but we insist

synthetically

added.

succession

that the
And, as the

.for it makes possible

the

Thi .a does not mean the idea of irreversibility

succession

"so far as existence

but that only through the representation
as object. "ll

but rather,

in the river,

the judgment is synthetic.

is a predicate

produces the objective

then, we are

of the bo~t going down the river

maintain

succession.

follows

the boat going down the river.

involves a sequence of ~presentations,

thing

of the apprehension

history,

the judgment that the apprehension

•1rreversibility"

is

I will apprehend it in its next position.

is ,in-eversible.

we still

as

order of perceptions

about one's psychical

follow that

first

objective

ot our perceptions

I app:rehend the boat at one position

not necessarily

stipulation

of an

Saying the order of perceptions

For example, suppose again,

I m~t

the apprehension

In sa.ying that the order is irreversible,

necessarily.

object.

as w.e regard our

the order

we ·111ustregard

by the object. 10

determined

insofar

is it possible

is concerned~ ••
to know any-
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What is being said,
of affairs

"A state

were this

that,

is ·true,

obtains

- cation we offer

a transcendental
not true,

is,

would lack the means to identify

objective

We may reformulate
objective

serviceability.

In this

synthetic

judgment.

indicates

the empirical

connection

as cause and the irreversible

necessary

connection

succession

Given apprehension

all

of an

is irreversible.

alone.

Given any

representations

those determinate

is

possi-

nature of -the object.

in time.

("some-

of something else 1112),
We have the object

sequence as effect. 13 The

in time is not between cause and effect

between the representations,

would

Hence, an objective

thing :from which we can conclude to · the existence

itself

in the assertion

judgment we have the idea of causality

and the idea of a necessary

justifi-

it.

the sequence of possible

which constitute

but

of which come under the heading of

effect.

We have a.rg-~ed that the ideas of an objective
1
1

2!,A24J.
\,

A205.

·

impossible as phenomenon, for we

1n terms of the object

Here "possible"

No logical

Rather than a logical

the sequence of representations

this

succession,

irreversible.
bilities

a synthetic

succession,

true.

the concept of objective
that

that,

can be apprehended

one which consists

would be theoretically

We have, then,

successive

but not analytically

from its denial.

lack real significance,

succession

1s that the proposition

which is objectively

1n only one order,"

contradiction

in a nutshell,

succession

and a

subjective

succession

the discussion

Our illlillediate purposes

of the "Second Analogy" were satisfied

duced to the concept

objective

are distinct.

of irreversibility

subjective

element of

But apart from this element of pure thought

succession.

the distinction.

when we intro".'"

as a necessary

is an element of pure intuition,

there

within

Objective

in making

are distinguished

representations

from

not only by the fact tha.t the former are

representations

thought as necessarily

l .ikewise, _involved

connected in time but also by the fact

that

the

former are intuited

in space.

some have suggested

(e.g., Cai:rd14) that the thought of the representa-

tions

as necessarily

as objective.
sufficient

connected is equivalent

If this

condition.

the idealism
the - thought

is a necessary

While _it

account of Kant's

then,

as

to the thought of them

condition, - it is not a

intuitive

element is -forgotten

in the

idealism it becomes quite easy to confuse it with

of Berkeley or Hegel,

Consequently,

of -a manifold of representation

thought of them as necessarily
not hold,

It would be wrong to think,

connected,

though we hold that

as objective

involves

the reverse -relation

That the order of representations

is necessary

the

does

does not

\

T'neir necessity

imply it is objective.

divine causality.

(Thus Kant may accept this notion

stllL ;wonder wherein lies
was

supposed to explain).

history,

The fact

14Ed.wa.rdCaird,
Yorks Kraus Reprint

might result

objectivity,

from the fact

of

of Berkeley's

and

which is something this

notion

Their may be laws which govern our mental

of objective

change for Kant, then,

is not constituted

The Critical
Philosophy ~ - Irnnuel
Kant, (New
Co., 1968), p. _568,
·
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by the fact

of necessity

involved the irreducible

of connection.
and.

T'nere nrust be further

inescapable · element of being

in space.

_, _

.

CONCLUSION
of the third

If' the argument
of' causality

possible.

1s objectively

it follows

then,

valid,

of that

that

·&

alleged

(a.nd this

i'or it

there

is not to assume

may be purely

inner)

relations.

causal

aX9

This is

to be

the

of . expeTience and those

which are discovered

connections

concerning

said

which Kant has shown to be

connection

of the possibility

condition

causal

it makes experience

something ought

between the causal

necessary

which 1.s to say,

to prove from the outset.

By way of conclusion,

· distinction

then the concept

experience,

necessarily

what we desired

is correct,

of experience

Assuming the fact

matter as the object

section

as a result

of re-

peated. experience.

Reca11 Hume's famous criticism
tions

in an inductive

w :-.observe
there
will

one sort

or empirical

assurance

by a B.

manner.

A, to follow

of thing,

is no absolute
be :followed

of efforts

that

another

there

th.is conspicuous

(ie might better
based

absence.

is a.n element of uncertainty

only

of connecti.on

sciences

instances).

o'f empirical

was the fact

laws

B,

of thing,

an A it

is to be observed

sequence will

Hence, Hume could claim that

generalizations,"
He could f'urther

is uncertain.

that the opposite

as a working hypothesis.

of -this

-with respect . to

them "empirical

on observed

very existence

signi:f'icant

call

sort

the next time we observe

No necessity

connec-

how many times

No matter

between A and 13, and no number of rep~itions
make up for

to prove causal

anyempirical

la.w.

for they are
claim that

What made this

the
claim

was assumed ·by the empirical

But Hume did not stop here.

He

-
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claimed further
with absolute

and,

no causal

certainty

extent,

Kant definitely
causality

logical

of the repeated

Kant intended

from experience,

causality

assertion

that

hypothesis

Iir.

conscious

does not commit Kant

of the idea of
'

or ever, for that matter.
not psychological.

Kant's

claim that a certain

the existence

of an objective

a.gs.inst Hume's claim that

are all uncertain,
of "science"

For

could be

we may say from a Kantian point of view,

his case.

makes possible

Kant was

is presupposed

to Hume's claim that no causal connection

with certainty,

that he overstated

of "science"

is not as

that the idea of causality

But this

one is explicitly

from the very beginning,

no way mitigates

the idea of

sequences of events.

from the very beginning.

With respect

connection

1t as such .

Hume was concerned with the psycho-

Kant, the issue at hand was logical,

established

to present

to Hume's thought,

by :.the very notion of a sequence, hence,

to the position
'
1

like

But even here there

of certain

concerned with the philosophical

1n experience

Now scholars

that we come to have the idea of "cause" as a result
observation

is presupposed

claimed the very idea

in terms of a response

as one might think.

assertion

And heals~

sta.~ds opposed to Hume's claim that

is derived

much clash

at all could be demonstrated

from experience.

thought on causality
to a certain

connection

to exist.

was derived

of causality

Kant's

that

(that

the empirical

and furthermore,

causal .
succession ' in
generalizations

that the working

every event has as its

J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic~
Experience,
Macmillan Company, 1936), Vol. I, pp. 377-8.

cause some

(New York, The

antecedent
Buchdahl

event)

lacks

demonstrated

validity.

objective

As Prof.

statess

"Con:fusion is for insta..11.cee~ily
pression like 'nature is subject

created by an exto law,'
Normally
th1s ·-denotes our believe .in the · universal
prevalence
of the realm of determinism;
or, less sweeping, of
the possibility
(at least ·1n principle)of
everything
being subject to natural
laws.
It is ho"-weverquite
clear that the argument of the Second Analogy does not
support such conclusions.
For according to this,
the
laws' refers
expression
'nature
is subject t-0 universal
to nature regarded as a collection
·of obj ective states
of
of affairs,
a.nd only means that the possi bility
ea.ch of these states presupposes the . injection of the
concept of an indeterminate
causal nexus.
However,
might be quite compatible . with the
such a situation
absence of a. network of empirical. laws, o.z: any laws
whatsoever." 2
•
·· ·
To end, we must warn against

states,

themselves

as subject

the temptation

to causal

to regard

la.w. N_ote,

mental

what .

for example,

N. K. Smith sa.ysa
"The Second Analogy,

though crabbedly,
diffusely,
and
stated,
is one
the finest and most
far-reaching
pieces of argument . in the whole Critigue.
It is of special historical
importance as -being Kant's
answer to Hume's denial of the validity of the causal
principle.
Hume had maintained that we can never be
conscious of anything but mere succession.
Kant 1n
reply seeks to prove that consciousness
·of succession
1s only possible through consciousness _ a necessit3
tha.t determines the o:rder of the successive events.~
even confusedly

of

of

Smith's
que ·stion

summation is apt to mislead

of purely

subjective,

or mental

one with respect
successions.

to the

We have,

indeed,

2
Gerd Buchdahl,

"The Kantian "Dynamic of Reason,'"
in Kant ·
Studies Today, L~ W. Beck editor,
(LaSalle;
llllno ls, Open Court
Publishing
Co., 1969), pp. 356-?.

~. K. Smith,!
Commentatj to Kant's Critique
(New Yorks Humanities Press, 1950),.p. 364~

of _Pure Reason,
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committed ourselves
· connection

to the contention

that the· idea of necessary

is involved in the consciousness

of subjective

But we are not thereby committed to the contention
states,

themselves,

sciousness

of

as empirically
time required

possibility

are necessarily

mental
states
real.

as successive

se1ves,

the empirical

reality

of matter requires

it · is neither

stated

are necessarily

connection
objective

succession,

of inner succession

of a subjective

of alteration

the "Parallogisms"

legitimately

Though it is

Moreover, if the idea of necessary

to the idea of objective

is concerned with the necessary

of

involves the idea of

between a subjective

and an

if it applies

it would seem quite obvious that

itself,

reality

nor implied that mental phenomena, them-

to the distinction

objective _ succession -is,

experience

involved the idea of time

the co-ncept of causality.

connected.

is essent1al

the consciousness

W'eargued that con-

of matter, ·-and, . f1.nall.y, that the

to one; it would not apply to the other.
essential

that the subjective

We then argued that the empirical

true then, that consciousness
causality

connected.

succession.

The concept of causality

is

succession and is . presupposeq. in
succession only because the idea of
presupposed.

condition

of substance.

that the succession

regarded as constituting

The "Second Analogy"

of the possibility
Kant .makes it quite

of mental states
the alteration

of an
clear

in

cannot be

0£ a substance.

60

BIBLICGRAPID'

Beck, L, 'W. (Editor).
Kant Studies Today.
Open Court Publishing
Company, 1969.
Bennett,

jonathan.

University
_____

•

Kant's

a

Illinois

Cambridge .: Cambridge

1966.

Press,

Kant's

Analytic.

LaSalle,

Dialectic.

Cambri dge University

Cambridge:

.

Press, 1974.
CaL"""Ci,
Ed.1'1'3.1'.'d.
The Critical

York, Kraus Reprint

Phllosonhy

Co,, 1968,

of Immanuel Kant.

New

2 vols.

H, W. 13. 8:..Comparison of Kant's Ideal:1,sm with That .2f
Berkeley.
London: Humphrey Milford Amen lfol1se, E,C., 1929
(Paper from the Proceedings
of the British Academy, ·volume

Joseph,

rl).

2f Pure Reason, Translated by Norman
Critique
New York: _ St, Harlin's
Press, 1965.

Kant, Immanuel,
Kemp Smith,

-----•·

Abbott,

Jnt!:2_(1.uction 12.~ogic.
Westport,
Connecticut:

Translated
by Thomas Kingsmill
Greenwood.Press,
1972.

--.....---•
Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural
lated and Introduction
by James Ellington.
Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1970.

Science,
TransNew York: The

______
, Prolegomena. !,2. Any Future Metaphysics.
Edited,
Translated,
and Introduction
by L. W. Beck. New Yorks T'ne BobbsMerrill
Company, Inc., 1950.
·

Paton. H. J. Kant's "Me
taphysic
of Experience.
·millan Company, 19.51. 2 vols,
Smith,

A. H.

Kantian

Studies,

· New York: The Ma.c-

· London: Oxford University

Press,

1~7.
Smith,

N. K.

~

Com.-inentary to Kant's
Press,1950,

~ri tique

Ef, Pure Reason'.

York: The Humanities
Strayson

7

P. F.

The Bounds of Sense,

·

London: . Methuen & Co Ltd,

1966.
_____

•

Wal.sh, W. H.

Press,

Individuals.

London: Methuen

Rea.son and Exuerience.

1$47.

-

-

&

Co Ltd,

1961,

Londons Oxford Un_iversity

New

61

Wolff, R. P. (Editor).
Kant.
Company, I nc., 196?-•.-

Garden City, New York, Doubleday

&

